T he September 11, 2001 (9/11), and subsequent anthrax terrorist attacks were pivotal moments in US history. They heightened awareness about the need for system coordination among federal, state, and local governments. In 2002, Congress enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act and appropriated nearly $1 billion annually to support state and local emergency preparedness and response to address bioterrorism threats; this was a significant effort to increase support for preparedness activities beyond the minimal funding that was available before 9/11. [1] [2] [3] In 2006, Congress enacted the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) and enhanced public health preparedness and response by expanding the focus from bioterrorism to all hazards, which includes threats from natural disasters; chemical, nuclear, or radiological incidents; and emerging or reemerging infectious diseases (Figure 1 ). 4 The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act in 2013 (PAHPRA) focused on further strengthening public health preparedness and response and reauthorized PAHPA. The PHEP program provides funding to state, local, and territorial governments to advance public health to prevent, protect, respond, and rapidly recover from health emergencies (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives, etc.) that threaten to overwhelm routine business and health security. Furthermore, PHEP supports the advancement of preparedness goals as outlined in the National Health Security Strategy by (1) establishing robust public health emergency management and response programs within state, local, and territorial public health agencies; (2) supporting key public health capabilities necessary for emergency planning and response; (3) ensuring response readiness for public health emergencies and disasters; and (4) promoting the health security of communities.
In 2011, to assist state and local public health departments with their strategic planning, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published national public health preparedness standards. 7 This document enumerated 15 public health preparedness capabilities within 6 public health preparedness domains (biosurveillance, countermeasures and mitigation, information management, community resilience, incident management, and surge management) and listed associated functions within each capability describing elements needed to achieve that capability (Table 1) . 7 The purpose of this article is to describe the progress made toward developing preparedness capabilities among PHEP jurisdictions from before the 9/11 terrorist attacks through 2016.
METHODS
Public health departments from 62 jurisdictions received funding since 2002 through the PHEP cooperative agreement, which is administered by CDC. 8 The among all 62 awardees. PHEP directors completed a 45-item Web-based questionnaire that addressed capability status retrospectively (before 9/11) and at the time of the inquiry (June 2014). Directors had 6 weeks to submit their response. Periodic reminders were sent by e-mail and announced during awardee national conference calls. 2016 Annual Public Health Preparedness Capabilities Assessment. Since 2012, all 62 jurisdictions conducted annual capability planning self-assessments by using the 15 national capability standards as part of the program requirement. 7 Jurisdictions reported current status for each function within a capability according to a 5-point Likert scale (1 = no ability or capacity; 2 = limited ability or capacity; 3 = some ability or capacity; 4 = significant ability or capacity; and 5 = full ability or capacity). 7 We recoded this scale during analyses into a dichotomous variable in which jurisdictions that reported values of 3 or greater were considered to have established function and those that reported a value of less than 3 were considered "not established." For functions rated less than full ability or capacity, jurisdictions were asked to indicate primary challenges or barriers from a predefined list.
Statistical Analysis
We analyzed preparedness status as measured by a range of capability functions at 3 time points: (1) before 9/11, (2) as of 2014, and (3) as of 2016 (based on capability planning). We aligned data from the 2016 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities Assessment at the capability function level with the 2001 and 2014 data from the PHEP Impact Assessment. We collected similar content on capability function between these 2 assessments; however, the questions were not identical.
We assessed descriptive and summary statistics including mean, median, range, frequencies, and percentages by using SAS version 9.3 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). We used percent difference to measure change in capability over time.
RESULTS
Response rate for the PHEP Impact Assessment was 97% (60 of 62). Most jurisdictions retrospectively reported limited to no capability functions before 9/11. However, by 2014, most jurisdictions reported substantial development and overall improvements in capability planning down to the function level across all 6 domains ( Table 2) .
Capability Improvements
Most notably, by 2016, all 62 jurisdictions reported 100% incident management infrastructure capability. Greatest gains were observed in countermeasures and mitigation, with an almost 200% increase in the number of jurisdictions reporting points of dispensing sites and storage and distribution capability, and similarly a 193% increase in those reporting inventory management systems. Smaller gains occurred in the biosurveillance domain, although still large, with a greater than 150% increase in the number of jurisdictions reporting capability for electronic lab reporting (Table 2) .
Significant improvements were reported in preparedness capability functions across all domains from 2014 to 2016, although gains were smaller. The largest gain occurred within the surge management domain, with a 55% increase in jurisdictions reporting sufficient plans for vulnerable populations; however, the only reduction in capability was also evident in this domain with a 12% decrease in the number of jurisdictions reporting developed coordination between the health system and public health agencies.
Capability Challenges
The most commonly reported challenges for overall capability functions from 2012 to 2016 included (1) missing or incomplete plans, (2) difficulties securing trained personnel, and (3) inadequate funding for recruitment of personnel. Although these were consistently reported as the top 3 capability challenges each year, percentages of awardees reporting them decreased across the 3 time periods. Awardees reporting missing or incomplete plans decreased by 28%; awardees reporting difficulties securing trained personnel decreased by 9%; and awardees reporting inadequate funding for recruitment of personnel decreased by 25%. Other common challenges reported in 2016 include lack of supporting infrastructure (18%), administrative barriers (19%), and additional corrective actions or testing necessary for the function to be fully in place (30%).
Funding Data
Since 2001, Congress allocated $12.5 billion (in 2016 dollars) in PHEP funding and $1.9 billion (in 2016 dollars) in supplemental funding (appropriated after the fiscal year has begun) to support large-scale public health outbreaks of national concern including allocations for pandemic influenza in 2006, H1N1 
DISCUSSION
Public health preparedness capabilities standards were developed to assist public health departments with strategic development and planning. This article represents the first evaluation of progress in capability planning ascertained from PHEP-funded jurisdictions. All jurisdictions self-reported substantial improvements in preparedness capabilities across all 6 domains. The large increases that were noted across the domains may reflect an increase from the low baseline capabilities before 9/11. Advances in preparedness capability are evident despite fluctuations in funding. However, there is widespread concern among public health professionals on the capacity of state and local health departments to sustain the capabilities developed or improved since 2001.
Congressional funding supports the development of public health preparedness and response at the federal, state, local, and territorial levels. Per capita PHEP funding decreased with each successive fiscal year. Total funding for public health as a share of overall health spending declined from 3.18% in 2002 to 2.65% in 2014, and it is projected to fall further to 2.40% in 2023. 14 Signs of deterioration of capability functions are evident by recent reports from city and local health departments. For example, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene reported that an inability to offset the continuous decline in PHEP funding may lead to a decrease in surveillance and response capacity, public health emergency preparedness workforce staffing and development, and number of volunteers from Medical Reserve Corps. 15 In addition, the report suggested that limited resources may have an impact on the department's ability to respond to real emergencies, train and exercise, and participate in regional collaborations. 15 Similarly, a study by the North Carolina Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Center invited 333 local health departments representing 40 states to complete a questionnaire on preparedness capacity from 2010 to 2012 and found declines in reported preparedness capabilities. 16 Specifically, they found a reduction in surveillance and investigation and legal preparedness. Significant decreases in planning and protocols, communication, and incident command were also noteworthy. 16 These reports have shown the importance of sustained resources to meet the basic preparedness needs at state, local, and city levels.
Efforts to improve the definitions and measurement of public health emergency preparedness capabilities are ongoing. The progress made since 9/11 in developing, building, and sustaining robust public health preparedness capabilities are now foundational for public health preparedness and response systems that support large public health responses. 17 For example, the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, 2014 Ebola virus outbreak, and 2016 Zika virus outbreak demonstrated the usefulness of preparedness and response capabilities in state, local, and territorial health departments across the nation. [17] [18] [19] This analysis is subject to several limitations. First, analyses were based on selfreported data and are therefore subjective. Second, there were no baseline data systematically collected before 9/11, nor were health departments conducting capability assessments before 2012. As a result, pre-9/11 preparedness capabilities could be subject to recall bias; staffing and administration changes might influence institutional memory and reported data may not be accurate. However, responses represent best knowledge to date. Of note, the financial portion of this analysis does not take into account any additional funding that the jurisdictions may receive beyond the PHEP program.
Public health emergencies affect more than the health of the nation; large emergencies can have far-reaching political, economic, and social consequences. 20, 21 To that end, the PHEP program highlights achievements in public health emergency preparedness and response. Support of the nation's preparedness infrastructure is critical to safeguard national health security and ensure that the nation is prepared to respond and recover from all hazards that have an impact on public health. 
